In contrast, the minority party has no such obligation and instead has an opportunity to score political points and establish a public record against government borrowing. This is particularly true of the House Republicans, who, as a "permanent" minority with little influence on budget outcomes, use the floor debate and debt vote as policy platforms (Jones, 1970) . Party control of the White House is also important, as members are likely to be less critical when the proposal comes from a President of their party.
"Must-Pass" Legislation
Finally, debt limitation bills also can achieve certain procedural objectives by facilitating the passage of controversial legislation. The bills have become increasingly attractive in recent years as a way to overcome the legislative logjam in Congress. Because failure to extend borrowing authority ultimately results in government default and the failure to make benefit payments such as Social Security, the legislation must pass. As divided government and legislative gridlock have increased, debt-limit bills accordingly have become more important. They have attracted not only germane amendments dealing with the budget and debt but a host of nongermane amendments as well. At times, however, the relationship may be reversed, with attractive amendments-such as increases in Social Security benefits-added to make the debt extension vote more palatable to reluctant members.
Fiscal Norms and the Evolution of the Debt Liit
Hostility to borrowing by the federal government and the ideal of a balanced budget go back to the beginning of the Republic. While government borrowing and federal debt have always had economic consequences, their political symbolism has been equally important. The meaning of the symbolism has changed significantly over the years, however. Issues surrounding federal debt were most sharply framed in the 1790s by Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson, reflecting their very different visions of the powers and responsibilities of the federal government. Behind Jefferson's opposition to Hamilton's sanctioning of federal debt was the notion of "corruption," meaning not merely graft, but an undermining of the basic republican nature of government (Savage, 1988, ch. 4). In Jefferson's view, a government saddled with debt would weaken its constitutional foundations because of the resulting social and economic inequality; the wealthy aristocracy, speculators, and bankers who financed the debt would gain financial leverage on the government. In 1798, Jefferson proposed a balanced budget amendment to the Constitution to eliminate the federal government's ability to borrow (Savage, 1988, p. 106). Two generations later, Andrew Jackson echoed the same themes, urging the reduction of debt and limits on the sources of federal revenues, particularly through tariffs.
The symbolic importance of federal debt and a balanced budget shifted after the Civil War, a deficit-financed war fought to defend, not undermine, the Constitution. During the next 70 years of Republican dominance, federal spending was significantly expanded to support capitalism and industry. These expenditures were financed through a system of high tariffs that were justified as necessary to prevent deficits and to retire debt (Savage, 1988, p. 122) . In reality, expanded federal spending was also needed to prevent budget surpluses, which were considered as undesirable as deficits. By the turn of the century, as a result of the Progressive movement, balancing the budget became an important symbol of efficiency and integrity in government. As revenues became more dependent on income taxes rather than tariffs, Republican opposition to federal borrowing solidified.
Congress first enacted legislation to statutorily limit the borrowing authority of the U.S. Treasury as part of the Second Liberty Loan Act in 1917, as a means of consolidating Treasury borrowing following the United States's entry into World War I (Congressional Record, Sept. 24, 1917, pp. A991-A993; Cantor and Stabile, 1990) . Until 1940, the borrowing authority of the Treasury remained remarkably stable; between 1921 and 1931, it stayed unchanged at $43.5 billion. In the years that followed, however, the exigencies of the Great Depression and the United States' entry into the Second World War sharply increased the need for public borrowing. This required the Democrats to attempt to alter the political symbolism of deficits and debt, a difficult and uncomfortable task. Keynesian theories legitimized deficit spending but confronted the powerful balanced budget norm. Republican opponents of Roosevelt attacked the New Deal and the deficits associated with it, establishing the foundations of partisan conflict over federal borrowing that continue through the present day.
In 1945, Congress overwhelmingly approved a permanent debt ceiling of $300 billion. The seven years following 1945 provided little opportunity for partisan politics over the debt ceiling. Between 1945 and 1953, only one amendment was made to the Second Liberty Loan Act-in 1946 to decrease the debt-limit ceiling from $300 billion to $275 billion. Although the Employment Act of 1946 justified borrowing to counter downturns in the business cycle, fiscal orthodoxy opposing deficit spending and the accumulation of government debt remained strong (Stein, 1969) .
Equally important were congressional norms and institutional arrangements that gave conservatives firm control of the authorizing and appropriations process. Indeed, the appropriations committees, especially in the House, took pride in their role as the "guardians of the Treasury" and regularly appropriated funds below the levels requested in the President's budget (Fenno, 1966) . Other important committees, such as the tax-writing House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees, were guided by powerful and conservative chairmen. The norms and structures that favored conservative approaches to government finance would eventually prove inconsistent with majority preferences in Congress.
The symbolic importance of federal debt remains central to understanding Congress's role and performance. Over the past 40 years, extending the federal government's borrowing authority has become necessary more frequently and has become increasingly contentious. Today, the national debt is rising faster, borrowing limits are reached sooner and must be raised by larger and larger amounts. Table 1 shows the expansion of debt subject to statutory limit over the past 50 years, increasing from $43 billion in 1940 to nearly $4 trillion today. Table 2 compares five-year periods since 1950, showing the number of times the debt limit had to be increased, the average duration of the limit, and the percentage increase over five years. The limit increased only 2 percent between 1951 and 1955; between 1986 and 1990, it increased by nearly 120 percent. In the early 1950s, the limit was adjusted twice for an average duration of 30 months. In the last 5 years of the 1980s, it had to be raised 15 times for an average duration of only four months.
In the pages that follow, we trace the politics of statutory debt limitation, focusing on its managerial, partisan, and procedural implications. We divide our analysis into the years before and after the adoption of the congressional budget process in 1974. Many important procedural changes occurred after 1974, but until 1990, at least, the statutory debt-limit votes remained important. By examining these changes over the past four decades, we hope to explain why Congress continues to engage in the difficult and seemingly unpalatable task of raising the debt ceiling when it has a negligible effect on fiscal discipline. Congressional debates, voting patterns, amendments, and rule changes within the House and Senate will help us draw some conclusions about the relationship between Congress and the public debt. Finally, we assess the prospects for debt limitation legislation in the future. The Democratic victory in the 1960 presidential election heralded a change in economic policy making as well as a shift in party control of the White House. President Kennedy brought with him a cadre of economists eager to implement policies reflecting the "new economics" of the Keynesian school, which included increased federal spending during recessions as a means of stimulating the economy. They introduced the concept of the "full-employment" budget that rationalized government borrowing if the economy were not operating at full capacity (Heller, 1967) . In testimony before the Senate Finance Committee on the FY62 budget, Budget Director David Bell told members that the projected deficit was "deliberately planned as an antirecession measure" (Congressional Record, June 28, 1962, p. 12154).
The administration gained some Republican support at first because many believed that the restraint of the Eisenhower administration during its last two years had let the economy stagnate. Keynesian economics was made more palatable by being presented in the form of a tax cut for individuals and businesses, the latter appealing to an important Republican political base-the business community. These factors made it possible to attract 40 of 153 House Republican votes in 1961 and 60 of 158 Republican votes in 1962 for the debt extensions (Table 4) . James Sundquist (1968, p. 49) suggests that Republican votes for the tax cut and the concomitant higher deficits meant that "they joined the Democrats in abandoning the notion that the budget should be balanced." The evidence suggests, however, that after the first two debt-limit votes, ideological lines and Republican opposition to extending borrowing authority stiffened, most notably in the House. The Democrats' new economic perspective was of limited success in changing the perception of the deficit and the debt. According to many accounts, members of Congress and even the President himself were sometimes dubious (Harris, 1964; Stein, 1969; Sundquist, 1968) . In its advocacy of Keynesian-based policies, the Kennedy administration made no secret about the effect on federal deficits but made a point of insisting that the full- Voting patterns through the 1960s revealed pronounced House-Senate differences among Republicans. Nearly half of the Senate Republicans supported legislation to extend borrowing authority. The bills tended to pass easily since approximately 80 percent of the Senate Democrats also supported the legislation. In the House, however, with members facing reelection every two years, Republican opposition became nearly unanimous, and with 30 to 40 defections among Democrats, debt increase measures passed only by narrow margins. As a result, the administration and House leadership had some difficulty putting together majorities sufficient to pass the necessary increase. In order to gain support at all, congressional leaders were forced to keep the increases low and the duration of the increase short, which resulted in more frequent votes.
Floor debate reveals that many members viewed a vote to increase the statutory debt limit as a referendum on the nation's economic policy and the different positions of the two parties. The link between debt ceiling votes and administration budget policy served to intensify partisan ideological attacks. Many Republican members argued that having voted for reduced appropriations during the prior year, they had no obligation to support the current proposal for increasing the debt limit. Illinois Republican Harold Collier's comments on the House floor were typical:
Because I have personally voted in a responsible manner on all authorization and appropriation bills since I have been a member of this body..., I refuse to be a rubberstamp for any administration when the debt limit legislation has been brought before us.. .(Congressional Record, June 18, 1964, p. 14360).
Political alignments changed little during Lyndon Johnson's presidency, despite his legendary legislative skills. Proposed increases in the statutory debt limits evoked the same united Republican opposition in the House, made increasingly rancorous by Republican perceptions that Johnson was using Vietnam War costs to cover borrowing for domestic programs. The administration's attempt to sell government securities, which were exempt from the debt-limit, was viewed as a gimmick designed to disguise the actual levels of federal spending. It only increased Republican perceptions that the administration could not be trusted.2 Two significant events occurred in 1967: the first outright defeat of debt-limit legislation and the first permanent increase in the debt ceiling since 1959. Not surprisingly, after years of clinging to the fantasy that borrowing was only temporary and would soon fall to lower levels, the increase in the permanent debt ceiling was highly contentious. Opponents portrayed the permanent nature of the increase as an admission of defeat in efforts to curb federal spending. Furthermore, it was evident that the belief in the ceiling as a means of controlling the deficit was slowly being put to rest. Representative Joe Skubitz (R-KS) spoke for most Republicans:
Mr. Chairman, I resent most strongly the very fact that for the ninth time since I entered Congress in 1963, the Members of this body are considering another raise of the public debt limit.... Today, every Member must surely realize how meaningless we have made this "permanent" debt figure. I would further question how any of us can believe that we will today be voting on any debt dollar limit which will be realized other than on paper (Congressional Record, June 7, 1967, p. 15055). (Table 5 ). In the meantime, members discovered that debt ceiling legislation was a useful vehicle for other legislative matters. Proposed amendments were not new to debt limit legislation; the difference was in their germaneness to the issue. Previously, amendments had been primarily concerned with the mechanics of debt management: the interest rates on government bonds, sales of government-owned certificates, or more often reduction of the size of the increase itself. In the House, Ways and Means Committee Democrat Charles Vanik (D-OH) unsuccessfully attempted to offer two amendments to the 1970 debt ceiling bill: one to reduce the debt limit increase and another to cut the military budget by $6 billion. Two amendments were offered in the Senate to the same bill: one to postpone a congressional pay raise until the federal budget was balanced and the other to establish an overall ceiling on federal expenditures.
The Debt Limit as
The issue that became most closely associated with debtlimit legislation during the Nixon administration was Social Security. Senate debate on the 1971 debt bill was dominated by discussion of the Social Security provisions, overshadowing the original purpose of the bill. It was the first of three instances when the Senate would attach popular Social Security legislation to a debt ceiling bill. Controversial amendments, such as one suspending bombing in Cambodia, became more common. Delay in enacting debt limits increasingly threatened to disrupt government operations; a filibuster against a campaign finance reform amendment delayed the approval of a 1973 debt ceiling bill until two days after the expiration the previous "temporary" limit.
The strategy of using essential debt ceiling extensions for legislative purposes was adopted by the President as well. In the debt ceiling bill he sent to Congress in 1972, President Nixon included a controversial spending ceiling and provisions to give the President broad impoundment powers with which to meet that limit. Although the provisions were later deleted altogether in conference, it is a telling example of the potential of the "must-pass" bill for both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue.3
Despite the changes in the politics of statutory debt limitation, a consistent theme from earlier periods remained: the attempt to cut proposed debt limit increases linked with the expressed need to curb federal spending. By this time, however, many members recognized the need for additional tools for Congress to exert greater control over spending and borrowing. Support grew for creating an entirely new congressional budget process.
Statutory Debt Limitation after Budget Reform, 1976-1990
The Schick, 1980) . The budget act made no specific changes or references to the Second Liberty Loan Act, but section 310 of the act provided that the budget resolution would "specify the amount by which the statutory limit on the public debt is to be changed and to direct the committees having jurisdiction to recommend such change" (Public Law 93-344, Title III, Section 310 (3)).
It was generally believed that the process would help reduce federal borrowing by requiring a majority of members to go on record supporting a deficit and an increase in the national debt before the fact. Under the old system, when congressional taxing and spending decisions produced a deficit, the statutory debt ceiling had to be raised after the fact. With the required votes on first and second concurrent resolutions on the budget, reformers believed that Congress would be less likely to allow a deficit or expand the national debt. Such optimism would prove unfounded as budgets remained unbalanced, and the politics of statutory debt limitation was left largely unchanged by budget reform.
Looking at the patterns of debt growth before and after the implementation of budget reform suggests it had little effect on debt limitation. The debt continued to accumulate at approximately the same pace in the five years after budget reform as it had in the previous five years. The debt expanded even more rapidly in the 1980s, tripling in less than ten years. Budget reform also had no noticeable impact on the growing frequency of debt extensions (Table 2 ). In 1976, congressional leaders attempted to synchronize the statutory debt limit with the government's new fiscal year. A 15 month extension running through September 30, 1977, was adopted. This effort proved unsuccessful, however, since the ceiling was either reached sooner than expected or a majority would only support an extension of shorter duration. Nor was there any new "realism" about the exercise, despite expert testimony that separate statutory limitations now made even less sense from a policy perspective. In addition, the fiction of the temporary versus the permanent extension was continued after budget reform. The permanent debt limit stayed at $400 billion for almost a decade as the government's actual borrowing needs grew to $925 billion. Not until 1983 did Congress eliminate the distinction between the permanent and temporary debt limits.
Elimination of the Separate House Vote
In 1979, four years after the implementation of the congressional budget process, the House of Representatives adopted an amendment by Richard Gephardt (D-MO), eliminating the requirement that the House have a separate vote on the statutory debt limitation. As the budget process became more time consuming and difficult, particularly in the House, pressure grew to reduce the number of these highly contentious votes. This had been tried once before. In 1978, the Ways and Means Committee had unsuccessfully attempted to link the debt extension to the budget resolution. Many worried that adding another burden to the already controversial budget resolution might make it impossible to enact.
There was also a constitutional problem: the congressional budget was enacted through a concurrent resolution binding only on Congress and did not need the signature of the President. The debt, however, had to be limited by statute, signed by the President. Members were not anxious to involve the President in the congressional budget process, so the two procedures remained separate. The Ways and Means Committee attempted to link the two actions informally by enacting debt ceiling legislation immediately after the adoption of the budget resolution.
By 1979, however, a majority of House members were ready to eliminate the troublesome debt limitation vote. Gephardt devised an approach that avoided the constitutional problem. His amendment provided that the debt limit, approved as part of the concurrent budget resolution, would be inserted in a joint resolution deemed to be passed by the House. It would then automatically be sent to the Senate to await action and final approval, and then the signature of the President (HR 5369, H Rept. 96-472) . Support for the change was solid; the House defeated a motion to strike the amendment from the bill by a vote of 132-283 (Congressional Record, Sept. 26, 1979, p. H26349).
The change in the process did not eliminate separate votes on the debt ceiling in the House, although it reduced them. If the joint resolution sent to the Senate was amended in any way, the House had to vote on the conference report. In instances where the limit was reached before a budget resolution had been approved, or in years where the House could not approve a budget resolution on time, separate votes would have to be taken. Even if frequent voting did not actually serve to reduce borrowing, some believed that at least the process helped publicize the problem. John Ashbrook (R-OH) explained that In the consideration of the debt limit bills, our attention is focused solely of the amount of debt this country has accumulated. We need to do this from time to time. In budget resolutions, the debt limit tends to disappear in a morass Treasury Department actions taken in response to congressional delays or the expiration of borrowing authority are summarized in Table 7 . As the table indicates, the administration had to adopt defensive measures throughout the 1980s to allow the government to keep paying its bills. One of Treasury's problems is that their transactions are seasonal and "lumpy," not evenly spaced over the year. Heavy borrowing takes place in the fourth quarter because no major income tax deadlines occur. Although we found no systematic accounting, it is generally believed that delays in extending and allowing borrowing authority to expire has cost the government hundreds of millions of dollars.4
Clarifying Partisan and Ideological Differences
Patterns of partisanship that appeared in the 1960s have continued in recent years. As the debt has grown more rapidly and debt legislation has come to the floor more often, political opportunism has not diminished. Congressman Ed Jenkins (D-GA) concluded that opposition to the debt extension boiled down to nothing more than politics. (Table 8 ). This was despite the fact that federal borrowing grew much more rapidly under Reagan than Carter.
First of all, there is always the political aspect of it. I do not think anyone in this

Amendments to Debt-Limit Legislation
In the face of a growing deadlock between the Republican President and the Democratic Congress, the statutory debt limit became increasingly popular as a means to move bills through the legislative process during the 1980s. The increased centralization of authority in Congress during the 1980s was associated with the so-called "four bill system" that included the statutory debt limitation (Dodd and Oppenheimer, 1989, pp. 48-51). The ability of the leaders to control access to these bills, particularly in the House, significantly strengthened their power. Amendments to the debt limitation legislation in the past two decades encompassed both germane and nongermane amendments. Senate spent five weeks debating scores of amendments with most of the time consumed by Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), who was determined to limit federal court jurisdiction over school prayer and busing. It became clear that the amendments would topple the bill, and Baker was forced to renege on his promise. A bipartisan agreement that no amendments whatsoever would be allowed on the bill, including those already adopted, facilitated final passage.
Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) reduction in income taxes
Despite the range of amendments offered to debt-limit legislation, the record of success was not impressive; few of the amendments were enacted. Although the potential of the debt limitation as "must-pass" legislation appears high, it has not proved an effective means in practice for adopting nongermane legislation. It has, however, been much more important as a vehicle for budget and deficit-related measures.
Budget and Deficit-Related Amendments. Major germane amendments from the late 1970s to the present are summarized in Table 11 . In 1978, as we have seen, the House attempted to eliminate separate votes on the debt limit. This effort was successful in 1979 with the adoption of the Gephardt amendment. The same year, an amendment was offered in the Senate to instruct the budget committee to submit a budget resolution providing for a balanced budget in the coming years. Other budget-related amendments included limiting federal revenues as a proportion of GNP, a spending freeze, support for a line-item veto, and a requirement that amendments to increase spending be offset by tax increases or spending cuts. The most important budget-related rider was the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings mandatory deficit reduction law that was adopted in 1985 and amended in 1987 and 1990.
As frustration with exploding deficits and ballooning federal debt came to a head, a scheme for mandatory deficit reduction became the dominant issue in Congress in late 1985 (LeLoup et al., 1987) . The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, better known by the name of its sponsors as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, was offered as an amendment to that year's debt limitation legislation. Its success was propelled by the political concerns members had with voting against anything that purported to reduce deficits. Over a period of three months, delicate negotiations between the Democratic House and the Republican Senate produced a compromise that was unpopular, but in the words of one cosponsor, was a "bad idea whose time had come" (LeLoup et al., 1987, p. 85). Pressure was maintained on negotiators by successfully blocking any attempt to enact stopgap borrowing authority. When Social Security and other benefit checks were in jeopardy in November, temporary authority was finally extended. The key compromise that allowed the bill to pass involved an agreement that any across-the-board cuts (sequesters) would fall equally on domestic and defense programs. The bill set deficit targets for five years and required automatic cuts in nonexempt programs unless Congress met the targets.
The statutory debt limit would prove critical in 1987 as well. When the Supreme Court struck down the automatic across-the-board cuts in Gramm-Rudman-Hollings because of the role of the Comptroller General, proponents set out to restore them (Bowsher v. Synar, 1986). Although efforts failed in 1986, they succeeded in 1987 by holding the debt limitation hostage until a Gramm-Rudman-Hollings "fix" was adopted. Others attempted to use the debt-limit bill to force President Reagan to a budget summit with Congress. Once again, the debt bill was the focal point of the partisan battle between Reagan and the Democratic House and Senate. Conferees finally agreed in September on Gramm-Rudman-Hollings II, which fixed the constitutional flaw and revised the deficit targets. Perhaps the greatest accomplishment of the bill was the extension of the debt limitation from $2.1 trillion to $2.8 trillion, the largest increase in history and enough to last through ... ...........,................ .... ........ ............ .. . ............ ..,... ........... . ... ..........''......... ............. . . . .. .""""""."","""" ".' "".""","".,,.,.""""""""",.,' """.' """",.,.",.,"".""".,."",. ............." .............,.,.,. .................. ....... ........... .... ................,................ . . I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -------------------------------------------- ................. .... ..............................  I . . . . . . .......... ...'. .... .......... .  ....., .,., ...................... . ...,.. .,............. ............ ... .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . -. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . ' I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . After nearly half a century, there are signs that the debt limitation may finally be receding in prominence and importance. The statutory debt limit did not play a critical role in 1990 during the adoption of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, which included the Budget Enforcement Act (Congressional Budget Office, 1991, pp. 43-57). In fact, members seem increasingly willing to forego voting on the controversial measures. No significant amendments have been adopted since 1987. In 1990, the debt limit held a low profile among the larger budget issues: extensions were simply rolled into the stopgap continuing resolutions until a final agreement was reached (Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, October 6, 1990, p. 3187). At one point, negotiators made an effort to extend the debt limitation for the full term of the agreement, which would have eliminated such votes for five years. Finally, in compromise, negotiators agreed to extend the debt limit to an amount that they believed would last until early 1993, after the presidential election.
Although events since 1987 suggest that Congress is turning away from the statutory debt limitation as an effective policy, oversight, or even political tool, it has not yet disappeared from the scene. To date, the Senate has not seriously considered adopting the equivalent of the Gephardt amendment, which would simply make the debt limit part of the budget resolution. When the limit is reached in early 1993, Congress will once against have to decide how to deal with the debt limit in the context of broader budgetary issues. Once again, the debt ceiling could be the vehicle for, major changes in budget policy and the congressional process.
Summary and Conclusions
Although congressional responses have changed over time, many themes have remained consistent, including the high degree of significance attached to statutory debt ceiling votes. The practice of periodically increasing the debt ceiling appears to be something of a puzzle. Each vote calls attention to the increased size of the debt, a pattern about which members have been clearly uncomfortable. Treasury officials have repeatedly made plain to Congress that the ritual serves no useful function and that a one-time vote to remove the statutory debt ceiling altogether would put an end to these votes. Yet despite the disagreeable position the vote puts them in, and despite its limited utility as a management tool, Congress has maintained the practice.
We believe the puzzle is, in part, explained by the way in which the votes have served members' needs in other ways. Our examination of the 57 debt ceiling increases since 1945 show that such motivations do exist. Member goals have evolved to reflect changes in legislative institutions, the relationship between Congress and the executive, and norms within Congress. Yet it has not been the case that the emergence of one purpose has replaced those before it. Rather, new goals have been encompassed within former practices.
The member goals we identified include: (1) managerial concerns: control of spending and oversight of the executive branch, (2) clarifying partisan and ideological differences on economic policy, and (3) exploitation of debt ceiling's must-pass status as a vehicle for other legislation. The earliest period of the study seemed to be dominated by debt management concerns. Given the conservative nature of Congress and the executive at the time, balanced budgets were valued as a goal by executive and legislature alike. As a result, member debate focused predominantly on the Treasury Department's explanation for the request and with admonitions about the rate of spending. 
